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Violence in the Niger Delta
For over two decades, Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta 
region has been affected by recurring cycles of 
violence in which several thousand people have lost 
their lives. Some of these violent episodes have been 
more devastating and virulent than others; yet all 
have been linked, in one way or another, to Nigeria’s 
huge oil wealth, and the struggle over its appropriation 
and distribution between the region and the federal 
government in Abuja. As Nigeria transitioned from 
military to civilian-electoral rule in 1999, both those 
responsible for the violence and the political context 
in which it has played out have evolved. Earlier social 
mobilisation for ‘resource control’, development and 
a halt to environmental destruction was overtaken 
by armed militancy with close ties to organised crime.
Until the end of military rule, violence in the Delta 
was mostly driven by the federal state. Allied with 
powerful transnational oil companies, and heeding 
their calls for the maintenance of a trouble-free 
business environment, Nigeria’s military governments 
brutally repressed protest and social mobilisation. 
With the military-controlled transition to civilian-
electoral rule and the election of Olusegun Obasanjo 
(1999–2007) – a retired army general, former military 
head of state and candidate of the newly founded, 
patronage-based Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 
– the dynamics of violence in the Delta changed, 
but not for better.
 
Instead of opening up space for democratic politics, 
most elections were surrounded by bloodshed as 
corrupt politicians (more often than not associated 
with the PDP) and their political ‘godfathers’ in Abuja 
and elsewhere jockeyed for power in the oil-rich 
region. They armed youth gangs to intimidate and 
assault political contenders and rig polls. In this 
increasingly violent setting emerged a new breed 
of armed militant groups capable of dealing serious 
blows to the vital oil industry and severely disrupting 
production. Their criminal activities, including 
kidnapping and the large-scale theft and illegal refining 
of oil, expanded significantly under the watch – and 
sometimes the participation – of members of state 
security forces deployed to the Delta, as well as 
regional and federal political elites.
Until 2009, when President Umaru Musa Yar´Adua 
(2007–2010) of the PDP declared an amnesty for 
Niger Delta militant groups, the federal government 
sought to control the crisis through a mix of heavy-
handed military interventions and top-down, largely 
ineffective development initiatives. Neither the 
deployment of a Joint Task Force (JTF), which has 
been accused of committing grave human rights 
violations, nor the establishment of a specialised 
commission and a federal ministry charged with 
addressing development issues in the Niger Delta 
have visibly contributed to improving the situation 
in the region.
The oil majors’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives, including quite significant community 
assistance and development programmes, could not 
fill the void generated by the Nigerian government’s 
failure to deliver on development and improved 
governance. The oil corporations’ practice of paying 
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The crisis in the oil-rich Niger Delta in Nigeria is one of the world’s forgotten 
conflicts in which thousands have been killed and the country’s vital oil industry 
has suffered. In the past twenty years, environmental destruction, youth 
unemployment, poverty and organised crime (such as massive oil theft) have 
persisted or even increased. The federal government’s brutal military intervention, 
ineffective development initiatives and a strategy of coopting powerful militant 
group leaders with judicial and economic benefits have failed to address the 
causes and drivers of conflict. A bolder, longer-term approach to building lasting 
peace in the Niger Delta is urgently needed, in which Nigeria’s elite and their 
international partners commit to building a pro-development political settlement 
through far-reaching governance reforms.
for local security services spurred competition and 
violent conflict between communities and ethnic 
groups. International aid donors found the situation 
in the Niger Delta for the most part too risky, 
dangerous and volatile to maintain anything but 
a low profile with minimum exposure.
While the amnesty and the associated disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme 
has produced a drop in violence in the Delta, and 
oil production has returned to pre-2006 levels, 
many of the socio-economic grievances and political 
demands of local populations that sparked protests 
in the 1990s have not been addressed. 
Unemployment and lack of opportunities for youth 
remain particularly pressing problems. The DDR 
programme was designed in a hurry; the effective 
reintegration of mid-ranking commanders and the 
rank and file of the militant groups into social and 
economic life has not been a priority. Rampant 
criminal activities in the Niger Delta, including oil 
theft and illegal oil refining, have not been contained. 
Kidnapping appears to be on the rise again.
 
More than anything else, the amnesty has been 
a means used by the federal political elite to co-opt 
a small group of militant leaders into Nigeria’s 
post-1999 political settlement by offering them 
judicial impunity for their past misdeeds and 
lucrative financial opportunities in the oil industry. 
Likewise, the federal security forces have not been 
held to account for the serious human rights 
violations they committed in the Delta. President 
Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw from the Niger Delta 
who was Yar’ Adua’s vice-president and won a 
comparatively clean election in 2011 after serving 
as interim head of state following Yar’ Adua’s death, 
has also sought to maintain the peace through a 
strategy of rolling bargains with regional elites 
and ex-militant leaders. There is no accountability 
in these processes, and the magnitude of federal 
funds used to placate regional strongmen and their 
political ‘godfathers’ is open to speculation.
       
Nigeria’s post-1999 political settlement
Analyses of the emergence of social protest and, 
later on, armed militancy in the Niger Delta have 
focused on ‘need’ (grievances due to political 
repression and economic deprivation), ‘creed’ 
(feelings of selective discrimination and 
marginalisation based on beliefs and identity), and 
‘greed’ (personal or group pursuit of economic 
gain). Combined, these approaches capture 
important elements of the picture but fall short 
of contributing to an understanding of the broader 
political-institutional and political economy factors 
that have underpinned and driven violence in the 
Niger Delta since the 1990s.
A focus on the nature and evolution of Nigeria’s 
political settlement in the wake of the transition 
to civilian-electoral rule helps to shed light on the 
fundamental question of why violence involving 
a growing number of state and non-state actors 
escalated and receded at certain points after the 
political transition; and what would be the elements 
of a more effective strategy for addressing the 
causes and manifestations of violence or preventing 
its re-emergence. Political settlements can usefully 
be defined as formal and informal one-off events, 
such as political elite pacts, peace agreements 
and amnesties. But they also take the form of 
more dynamic and fluid processes of [overt and 
covert] negotiation, compromise, bargaining, 
accommodation, coalition and network-building 
between powerful individuals and groups.
Nigeria’s dominant elite includes senior 
government and civil service officials, political 
(party) leaders and ‘godfathers’, influential 
businessmen, retired military officers, Nigerian 
and international oil industry bosses, and Niger 
Delta community chiefs. All of them have vested 
interests in maintaining or expanding their stakes 
in Nigeria’s ‘oil poker’. There are some contending, 
pro-reform elites in the democratic political 
opposition to the hegemonic PDP, in pockets of 
the state at the federal and regional levels, and 
in civil society and the media. But they have been 
a relatively weak minority since the transition to 
civilian-electoral rule.
While it is crucial to recognise that Nigeria is not 
a failed state, it is equally important to acknowledge 
that it is a polity which is underpinned by a political 
settlement that constrains democratic politics, 
legitimate and effective governance and pro-
development reform – and drives violence in the 
Niger Delta and other parts of the country. For 
decades, oil and the appropriation of oil rents by 
domestic elites and their international oil business 
partners have shaped this settlement. 
There have been numerous political and social 
reform initiatives and push-back from pro-
democracy, human rights and social grass-roots 
organisations in the Delta and elsewhere  – even 
from sectors within the federal state and some 
regional governments. But thus far these groups 
have been unable to influence and change 
dominant elite interests and incentives in any 
significant way. Rather, they have been sidelined 
and/or victimised by alliances and coalitions of 
powerful state and non-state groups that have 
shown themselves to be determined to uphold 
the existing settlement, and use unlawful and 
violent means in the process.
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continue to 
prompt 
political 
violence and 
slow economic 
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Building a pro-development political 
settlement through governance reform
Addressing development and violence in the Niger 
Delta requires profound changes in the way 
Nigeria’s dominant elites relate to, and interact 
with, their own country and fellow citizens. Given 
the prominence of oil in the country’s political 
economy the aim should be to harness natural 
resource wealth for the benefit of the majority, 
not the few – whose ranks have recently been 
swelled by former militant commanders who 
learned that violence pays.
In this setting it is essential to focus on reforming 
governance, that is, the ‘processes of exercising 
public authority through the making of collectively 
binding rules and the effective provision of public 
goods and services by both state and non-state 
actors’. Emphasising the importance of governance 
reform questions the conventional assumption that 
it is the exclusionary nature of a political settlement 
that can promote violence. According to this view, 
a more inclusive or ‘inclusive enough’ political 
settlement reduces the risk of [contending] elites 
seeking recourse to violence, since they are included 
in authoritative political and economic decision-
making and policy processes.
The Niger Delta experience reveals that ‘inclusivity’ 
on its own is a weak indicator for determining 
whether a political settlement is violence-prone 
or not. The 2009 presidential amnesty and the 2011 
election of Goodluck Jonathan resulted in expanding 
the existing settlement through the co-optation 
of militant leaders into the conservative and 
predatory post-1999 political settlement, and the 
election of an Ijaw from the Delta to the highest 
office. Beyond contributing to the fragile pacification 
of the Delta, these processes have not led to any 
tangible changes in the way the federal and regional 
governments administer and distribute the country’s 
natural resource wealth, nor how they address 
grievances, poverty, criminality and violence in the 
Delta and beyond.
It is therefore paramount to ask how a political 
settlement is expanded to include additional 
political and social groups; who is included and 
why; and what the expansion of the settlement means 
in terms of reducing violence – or the risk thereof 
– through better governance and public policies 
that are capable of addressing socioeconomic 
grievances and other major drivers of violence, 
such as criminal opportunities associated with oil 
theft and kidnapping. Arguably, in Nigeria such a 
process requires significant and coordinated 
governance reforms at the local, regional and 
federal levels.
Policy outlook
Outside leverage for such reforms is limited. Issues 
of sovereignty and vested interests in the oil industry 
have led domestic political elites to resist international 
donor assistance on many occasions in the past. 
Consequently, donors have focused on low-key, 
small-scale interventions in the Niger Delta that 
have mostly been concerned with addressing regional 
and local governance, development and conflict 
mitigation issues. But they have shied away from 
engaging the ‘elephant in the room’, i.e. building a 
pro-development political settlement, which 
inevitably will continue to be oil-centred, through 
coordinated governance reform at the local, regional 
and federal levels. While the oil majors have 
evolved their engagement with communities in 
the Delta and are nowadays allocating significant 
amounts to community development, their business 
rationale continues to focus on profit-making and 
not governance reform.
Among progressive, reform-minded civil society 
and political and social sectors in the Niger Delta 
and Abuja there is a strong view that top-down 
and militarised approaches to development, conflict 
resolution and violence mitigation in the Delta have 
been counter-productive or outright failures. 
Strengthening accountability mechanisms at the 
local and regional levels are perceived to be crucial 
to improve service delivery, generate economic 
opportunities, particularly for youth, reduce public 
corruption and waste, and rein in the power of the 
massive patronage networks that feed on Nigeria’s 
oil wealth. It should be added that there is also a 
great need for strengthening accountability at the 
federal level and exercising more effective oversight 
of the oil majors and their operations.
Further, there is awareness that without first boosting 
accountability, elections will continue to prompt 
political violence and slow economic development, 
particularly if the patronage-based political parties 
are not reformed, and if they refrain from strengthening 
internal democratic structures and processes, such 
as primaries. Judicial impunity is seen as another major 
problem. Profound reforms of Nigeria’s ailing justice 
and law enforcement systems are required to rein in 
corruption and rampant [state-sponsored] criminal 
activities associated with the appropriation of oil rents. 
The 2009 amnesty and the DDR programme are 
perceived as federal government measures to placate 
and co-opt the most powerful militant leaders 
without contributing to building lasting peace and 
advancing development in the Niger Delta. The 
effective reintegration of former militants and their 
support networks into economic and social life has 
to be addressed urgently.  
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Policy recommendations
 • Policy action in the following macro-areas is key to advancing violence mitigation 
in the Niger Delta.
 • Strengthening accountability and mechanisms of redress at the local through to 
the federal levels of government and governance.
 • Building the capacity of Niger Delta civil society as well as community and social 
organisations and movements to participate in decision-making processes related 
to local and regional development and oil production.
 • Linking the reintegration into economic and social life of demobilised militants to 
local development efforts in the Niger Delta, with a particular focus on job 
creation and vocational training for youth.
 • Democratising Nigeria’s political parties, especially the PDP, to move away from 
patronage-based and godfather politics; and strengthening the electoral process.
 • Strengthening Nigeria’s justice system to reduce judicial impunity, corruption, 
human rights violations by state security forces and [state-sponsored] criminality, 
such as massive oil theft and illegal oil lifting.
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Opportunities and challenges 
for Nigeria and the international 
community
These are huge tasks for any country and 
they clearly are for Nigeria. However, if the 
country and its international partners, 
including the transnational oil companies, 
fail to think big and adopt a comprehensive 
and necessarily longer-term strategy to 
address serious governance problems that 
affect the situation in the Niger Delta, there 
is a real risk that the region will see the 
re-emergence of large-scale violence.
On a positive note, if Nigeria were to make 
progress on the governance front this would 
not only reduce the risk of violence in the 
Delta flaring up again, but also contribute to 
changing the intrinsically violence-prone 
nature of the post-1999 political settlement. 
This time the inclusion of non-violent elites 
would not come about through the co-
optation of powerful actors that are using 
violence and unlawful means to further their 
own economic and political goals, but through 
the strengthened democratic process and 
progressively more accountable and legitimate 
governance.
The international donor community should 
help Nigeria build a pro-development political 
settlement. It can do this by offering its good 
offices as a facilitator and supporter of   political 
and policy dialogue between Nigerians, 
increasing development assistance in the policy 
areas identified below, and reducing the 
negative fall-out of the oil majors’ interests 
and operations in the country.
